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The Boston mechanism and deferred acceptance (DA) are two competing mechanisms widely
used in school choice problems across the United States. Recent work has highlighted welfare
gains from the use of the Boston mechanism, in particular ﬁnding that when cardinal utility
is taken into account, Boston interim Pareto dominates DA in certain incomplete information
environments with no school priorities. We show that these previous interim results are not
robust to the introduction of nontrivial (weak) priorities. However, we partially restore the
earlier results by showing that from an ex-ante utility perspective, the Boston mechanism once
again Pareto dominates any strategyproof mechanism (including DA), even allowing for arbitrary
priority structures. Thus, we suggest ex-ante Pareto dominance as a criterion by which to
compare school choice mechanisms. This criterion may be of interest to school district leaders,
as they can be thought of as social planners whose goal is to maximize the overall ex-ante welfare
of the students. From a policy perspective, school districts may have justiﬁcation for the use
the Boston mechanism over a strategyproof alternative, even with nontrivial priority structures.
1 Introduction
Variants of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962)) and
what has come to be known as the Boston mechanism (which we will often refer to simply as
‘Boston’) are widely used by school districts throughout the United States to assign K-12 students to
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1schools. Understanding the advantages and disadvantages of these mechanisms is a matter of great
practical importance that has been the focus of extensive research, both theoretical and empirical.1
The two mechanisms have been widely studied, and choosing one over the other involves trade-
oﬀs between incentive and welfare properties. While earlier work promoted DA over Boston (e.g.,
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) and Ergin and Sönmez (2006)), several recent papers have re-
examined the Boston mechanism in settings in which participants have limited information about
the preferences of the other students and the (post-lottery) priority structures at schools and have
found advantages for the Boston mechanism. In particular, in incomplete information environments
with common ordinal preferences for the students and no school priorities,2 Abdulkadiroğlu, Che,
and Yasuda (2010) (henceforth, ACY) and Miralles (2008) show that the (symmetric) equilibrium
outcomes of the Boston mechanism actually interim Pareto dominate3 that of deferred acceptance.4
The contribution of the current work is two-fold. First, we study the robustness of the previous
interim Pareto dominance results to the assumption of no school priorities. We give two examples
with weak priorities in which some students are strictly (interim) better oﬀ under DA, and show in
a general model that the same will be true for any priority structure that satisﬁes a mild condition
that is likely to be satisﬁed by many real-world priority structures. These results are similar in ﬂavor
to many “impossibility theorems” in the matching literature, which often construct preferences to
show that certain properties of matching mechanisms will not hold in general (see, e.g., Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), chapter 4).
Second, because the mechanisms will in general not be comparable on an interim welfare basis
once we allow for priorities, we must search for alternative criteria by which to compare school choice
mechanisms. The criterion that we propose, ex-ante Pareto dominance, examines welfare before
students know their own types (cardinal utilities and priorities). From this perspective, we can once
again rank mechanisms, and we show that Boston ex-ante Pareto dominates any strategyproof (and
1Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) began this line of research into school choice. See Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak,
and Roth (2005), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005), and Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009)
for applications of the theory to the redesign of school choice mechanisms in Boston and New York City.
2We will often call such priority structures “trivial” priority structures. A nontrivial priority structure is any priority
structure that is not trivial.
3By interim utility, we mean a situation in which students know their own types but only the distribution of the
types of other students. Much of the previous work on this topic calls this “ex-ante” utility, but, in this paper we
will also examine welfare from the persepective before students know even their own types, and we reserve the term
“ex-ante” for this situation.
4See also Featherstone and Niederle (2008) who ﬁnd gains to the Boston mechanism over DA in an experimental
setting. Pais and Pintér (2008) is another experimental study that examines the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm
in addition to Boston and DA, ﬁnding that limited information may actually improve eﬃciency. Özek (2008) provides
simple examples of problems in which the Boston mechanism may Pareto dominate DA.
2anonymous) mechanism (including DA and TTC5), even allowing for arbitrary priority structures.
Thus, there is an explicit welfare cost associated with the use of strategyproof mechanisms.
Additionally, we argue that this criterion is especially relevant for school district leaders, as they
can be thought of as social planners whose goal is to maximize overall ex-ante welfare rather than
the interim welfare of any one individual. We can also interpret the results from from behind a
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” in that a student who was asked to choose between mechanisms before
she knew her place in society (in particular, her priorities) would pick Boston over a strategyproof
mechanism. Thus, while introducing nontrivial priorities causes diﬃculties in ranking mechanisms
from an interim perspective, our results provide a justiﬁcation for the use of Boston mechanism from
an ex-ante perspective, even when schools have priorities.
Since we are interested mainly in the role of priorities, we keep the common ordinal preferences
assumption for most of the analysis for simplicity. This assumption is used in the literature, and
may serve as a good approximation in some school choice problems where student preferences are
highly correlated.6 Without this assumption, the model becomes much more diﬃcult to analyze,
and, in these situations, computational results may prove useful. Miralles (2008) provides a similar
computational model suggesting that Boston unambiguously outperforms DA ex-ante, even with
arbitrary ordinal preferences and nontrivial priorities. This, combined with the theoretical results
presented here, suggests that ex-ante welfare may be a useful criterion for school districts to consider
when evaluating mechanisms.
This paper is related to the large number of works that have aided in the design of real-world
institutions by examining the incentive and welfare properties of centralized matching mechanisms
in general, and school choice mechanisms in particular. On the incentives side, Roth (1982) and
Dubins and Freedman (1981) show that deferred acceptance is strategyproof, while Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez (2003) point out that the Boston mechanism requires parents (or students) to play a
complicated strategic game and may harm naive students who fail to strategize. In fact, it is this
feature that was important in the city of Boston’s decision to abandon its namesake mechanism for
a deferred acceptance procedure. On the eﬃciency side, Ergin (2002) and Ergin and Sönmez (2006)
were the ﬁrst to discuss possible ex-post Pareto ineﬃciencies of the two mechanisms in a school choice
context. However, here we will be concerned with interim and ex-ante eﬃciency losses as a result
of the tie-breaking necessary to construct schools’ strict priority orderings over students, issues ﬁrst
5TTC is Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm, adapted to school choice problems by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(2003).
6See ACY, who impose common ordinal preferences, Featherstone and Niederle (2008), who study environments
with common ordinal and completely uncorrelated preferences, and Kesten (2010) who proposes an intermediate model
between common ordinal preferences and completely uncorrelated preferences.
3raised by Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2008), Erdil and Ergin (2008), and Abdulkadiroğlu,
Pathak, and Roth (2009).7
The papers most closely related to this one are Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2010) and
Miralles (2008), both of which investigate interim eﬃciency and show that Boston may actually
interim Pareto dominate DA in situations with common ordinal preferences and no school priorities.
The intuition is that Boston allows students to indicate a relatively high cardinal utility for a school
by promoting it above its true ordinal rank. However, the assumption of no school priorities may
not apply in many contexts. Many cities classify students into several priority levels at each school,8
with a student in a higher priority level being admitted before a student in a lower priority level
under Boston, if they rank the school the same. As we show, when this is allowed, the interim
welfare comparison between the two mechanisms is no longer clear cut, yet the ex-ante criterion we
propose allows us to rank mechanisms in a wider range of scenarios, providing guidance in mechanism
selection for school districts that may have complicated priority structures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy and informally describe
how the Boston mechanism and DA work, and discuss a few salient features of the mechanisms.
In section 3, we give two examples of school choice problems with nontrivial priority structures
in which the Boston mechanism no longer interim Pareto dominates DA. Section 4 extends these
examples to a general model, and identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition on the priority structure under
which Boston will no longer interim Pareto dominate DA. Section 5 examines welfare from an ex-
ante perspective, showing that from this viewpoint, Boston Pareto dominates any strategyproof and
anonymous mechanism, even with priorities. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Boston Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance
Since the workings of both the Boston mechanism and DA are well-known in the literature, we
give only an informal description of how they assign students to schools.9 Students submit ordinal
rankings over schools and schools have a priority ordering over students, which is usually given by
law (hence schools are not strategic in our models). Both mechanisms require the schools to have
7While most of the above works focus on speciﬁc aspects of the mechanisms, Kojima and Ünver (2010) takes a
general axiomatic approach to understanding the Boston mechanism, while Kojima and Manea (2007) does the same
for deferred acceptance.
8For example, Boston, Minneapolis, New York City, Seattle, and San Francisco all divide students into priority
classes based on various characteristics such as distance from a school, sibling attendance, etc.
9For a more complete description of these mechanisms in the context of school choice, see, for example, Abdulka-
diroğlu and Sönmez (2003).
4a strict priority ordering over students. For cases in which a school’s priority ordering is weak (i.e.,
the law gives many students the same priority) we use a random tie-breaking procedure to construct
a strict ordering with which the mechanism is then run.
Deferred Acceptance: In round 1, each student applies to her most preferred school. Each
school tentatively accepts the highest ranked (according to its priority ordering) students who apply
to it, up to its capacity, rejecting all others. In round t  1, any student who was rejected in round
t   1 applies to their next most preferred school who has not yet rejected them. The schools then
consider all applicants held from round t 1 and the new applicants in round t, and once again keep
the highest ranked set. The algorithm ﬁnishes when every student either has a tentative acceptance
or has applied to all acceptable schools.
Boston Mechanism: In round 1 of the Boston mechanism, all students apply to the most
preferred school on their list, and again, each school accepts the highest ranked set (according to
its priority ordering) of students who apply to it up to its capacity, rejecting all others. Unlike
DA, however, these acceptances are not tentative, but permanent. All schools’ capacities are then
decreased by the number of students accepted. In round t, each student applies to the tth ranked
school on their list, and each school accepts the best set of applicants up to the new capacity. The
algorithm ﬁnishes when every student is either accepted or has exhausted all schools on the list.
A few important features of these mechanisms should be pointed out. First, DA is strategyproof,
while Boston is not. Eﬀectively, under Boston, if a student ranks a school s second, she loses her
priority to all those students who rank s ﬁrst. Under DA, the acceptances in each round are tenative,
and so a student who ranks a school s second is still able to apply to and receive this school in later
rounds. While strategyproofness is an important feature, our results, as well as those of previous
papers on this subject, show that in the context of school choice, strategyproofness has a cost in
terms of welfare. The Boston mechanism allows students to express a high cardinal utility for a
school (by promoting it over its true ordinal rank if they foresee lots of competition for it), and it is
this logic that leads to the welfare gains associated with the Boston mechanism.
3 Two Examples with Weak Priorities
We retain the assumptions of common ordinal preferences and incomplete information about others’
cardinal utility values as in Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2010) and part of Miralles (2008),
but relax the assumption of no school priorities and show that some students may be strictly better
oﬀ under DA.
An important distinction is whether priorities are public or private information. If priorities are
5determined by such things as distance from a school, then they are in principle public. However, it
can also be argued that parents may not know the exact priority level of every other student, and
instead might have only an estimate of the number of students in a given priority level at a school
(i.e., we assume that they know the underlying distribution by which the priorities are distributed).
Treating priorities as private information keeps the symmetry that is the main driving force for the
interim Pareto dominance of Boston over DA, but, as we will show below, we are not able to Pareto
rank the mechanisms in either the public or private priority case. Example 1 treats priorities as
public information, while Example 2 draws each student’s priority level at a school i.i.d. across
students and schools.
Example 1
Let there be three schools A;B; and C with 1 seat each and 3 students labeled 1, 2 and 3. The
students all strictly prefer A to B to C, but may have diﬀerent cardinal utilities for each school
(discussed below). Each school has two priority levels (‘high’ and ‘low’), with the priority structures
given in the table below. In calculating expected utilities, we assume that ties within a priority level
are broken randomly.
School A School B School C
Students with high priority none 1 none
Students with low priority 1,2,3 2,3 1,2,3
The priorities are public information, while the students’ cardinal utility values v = (vA;vB;vC)
are privately drawn from V = fvL;vHg with probabilities pL for vL and pH = 1   pL for vH. Let
vH
A be the cardinal utility to a type vH student from receiving A, and likewise for vL
A, etc. Normalize
vi
A = 1 and vi
C = 0 (i = L;H), and let vH
B > vL
B.10
Student i’s strategy i : V ! () is a mapping from possible types to probability distributions
over all possible ordinal rankings of schools. We will write, for example, ABC to denote the (pure)
strategy of ranking A ﬁrst, B second, and C last. Consider the following strategies under the Boston
mechanism:11 i(vL) = ABC and i(vH) = BAC 8i = 1;2;3.
Before formally checking that this is an equilibrium of the Boston mechanism for some parameter
values, we brieﬂy discuss the intuition. If type vL’s are prevalent enough in the population, the above
10The notation H indicates that a student of type vH has a relatively high utility for B (compared to those of type
vL).
11Note that it is dominated to rank school C in the top 2 spots. We consider equilibria in undominated strategies,
and so a strategy here is essentially a choice to rank either A or B ﬁrst.
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Table 1: Calculating expected utilities
strategies will generate a lot of competition for A. Ranking A ﬁrst will nevertheless be optimal for
these students if vL places a relatively high utility on A (i.e., if vL
B is close to 0). On the other hand,
if vH places relatively high weight on B (vH
B close to 1), students of this type will ﬁnd it optimal to
apply to B in round 1 to avoid the competition at A. But, this makes student 1 of type vH worse
oﬀ under the Boston mechanism because under DA she is guaranteed a school no worse than B, yet
has some chance at her favorite school A.
Now, to ﬁnd parameter values for which the above strategies are an equilibrium, we ﬁx the
strategies of the other players and compute the expected utility for each student from each of her
two possible actions (recall a strategy is essentially a decision to rank A or B ﬁrst). The utilities for
each student from each action when of type vi are given in Table 1.12
For example, ﬁxing the strategies of the other players, if student 2 plays strategy ABC, with
probability p2
L the other two players are of type vL and therefore rank A ﬁrst. In this case, student
2 has a 1/3 chance of receiving A but only a 1/6 chance of receiving B because it is possible for her
to receive B only if the lottery is such that player 1 receives A (since 1 has a higher priority at B
and ranks it the same); this gives overall utility 1
3 + 1
6vi
B. The rest of the table is ﬁlled in similarly.
Also, note that students 2 and 3 are symmetric, and that, because of her high priority, student 1 is
admitted to B for certain if she ranks B ﬁrst.
If we use, for example, pL = 0:9 and pH = 0:1,13 we ﬁnd that ABC is the best response for
students 2 or 3 of type vi when vi
B < 0:51 (and BAC is the best response when the reverse inequality
holds). The analogous cutoﬀ value for student 1 is at 0.80. Thus, for vL
B < 0:51, the best response
of any student of type vL is ABC; similarly, for vH
B > 0:80, the best response of any student of type
vH is BAC. But, this means the proposed strategies are an equilibrium of the Boston mechanism.





B. For 1 = vH
A > vH
B > 0:80, this is clearly better than the Boston mechanism outcome we
constructed above for player 1 of type vH, who receives vH
B with probability 1. Thus, the symmetric
equilibrium of the Boston mechanism no longer interim Pareto dominates deferred acceptance.14
12We have substituted vi
A = 1 and vi
C = 0 in the table.
13The existence of cardinal utilities that support the equilibrium is not sensitive to the choice of pk’s. These numbers
are purely for illustration.
14Readers who are concerned about the uniqueness of the Boston equilibrium are referred to Proposition 1 below,
7Example 2
Symmetry is a large driving force of the interim Pareto dominance of Boston over DA, and
Example 1 may be criticized as not a true counterargument when priorities are introduced because it
is not symmetric: 1 is known to have a priority that 2 and 3 do not. As a robustness check, we show
that even if we keep this symmetry by allowing players to independently draw priorities as private
information, Boston still may not Pareto dominate DA.
Everything is the same as in Example 1, except that now each student is given high priority at
school B with probability qB = 1=3 (if they do not receive high priority, they receive low priority; all
students once again have low priority at schools A and C). As with the utility draws, each student
only observes the outcome of her own priority draw, and the draws are i.i.d. across students. Let Low
denote low priority and High high priority at B. With two possible utility draws and 2 priority draws,
there are now four possible types for each student: (vH;High);(vH;Low);(vL;High);(vL;Low).
Consider the following symmetric strategy proﬁle where all agents play strategy : (vL;Low) =
(vL;High) = ABC and (vH;Low) = (vH;High) = BAC.
Using the same parameter values as in Example 1 for illustration,15 it is possible to show that the
above strategies constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any vL
B < 0:53 and vH
B > 0:72.
Now, all that remains is to show that some types of students are better oﬀ under DA. The
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Given the speciﬁed parameters, algebra shows that for any vH
B < 0:80, DA dominates the Boston
mechanism for these types of students. So, to summarize: we have given an example of a priority
structure and type distribution such that, for any 0 < vL
B < 0:53 and 0:72 < vH
B < 0:80, we have an
equilibrium of the Boston mechanism under which some students are strictly worse oﬀ than under
DA.
The intuition behind both examples is straightforward. If a student with high priority at the
middle-ranked school B has a high enough cardinal utility for it, she is better oﬀ ranking B ﬁrst
which proves in a more general model that there exist type spaces for which student 1 will be better oﬀ under DA
than in any equilibrium of the Boston mechanism.
15The calculations are much more cumbersome, and so we do not print them all here. They are available from the
author. Once again, the exact choice of numbers is purely for concreteness, and the idea holds more generally.
8under Boston and getting it for sure (because of her priority). This is true because if she instead
ranked A ﬁrst and B is taken in round 1 by another student, she will be assigned C if she has a
poor lottery draw; the marginal utility gain from A to B is not worth the risk of ending up with C.
Under DA, she applies to A without giving up her priority at B. Since she has a chance at A but is
guaranteed no worse than B, she is better oﬀ.16
DA also does not interim Pareto dominate Boston in either example due to the mechanism
identiﬁed by ACY and Miralles (2008): students of type vH without priority prefer Boston because
they can strategize to gain a better chance at B in round 1. Thus, these two mechanisms will not
be comparable on an interim welfare basis.
4 Interim Welfare in a General Model with Weak Priorities
The intuition of these simple examples can be extended to a large class of priority structures which
includes many real-world examples. Intuitively, the condition on the priority structure we impose
guarantees two things: ﬁrst, that there exists some student i whose highest guaranteed school (i.e.,
a school at which she has high enough priority that she is certain to be admitted to it if she ranks it
ﬁrst under Boston) is in the middle of her ordinal rankings, and second, that i has a nonzero chance
of being admitted to some more preferred school.17 If these conditions are satisﬁed, we can construct
a type space for which the equilibrium outcomes of deferred acceptance and the Boston mechanism
are incomparable by interim Pareto dominance.
To formalize this, let S = fs1;:::;smg be a set of schools and N = f1;:::;ng a set of students,
with m;n  3.18 q = (q1;:::qm) is a vector of school capacities. We assume that
Pm
s=1 qs = n, so
that all students can be accommodated in some school,19 and that qs + qt < n for all distinct s;t so
that no two schools can accommodate all students. Additionally, all students are acceptable to all
schools.
Here only, we will not impose common ordinal preferences; this is not fundamentally important,
16This is actually complicated a bit in Example 2 with independent priority draws for all students, because a student
is no longer guaranteed a spot at B, as other students may also have priority there. However, since it is not “likely”
that there will be other priority students, the same general intuition works. This is also the reason there is an upper
bound on the vH
B’s for which students of type vH with priority are better oﬀ under DA.
17This is probably satisﬁed in Boston, for example, where 50% of seats are set aside for walk-zone priority students.
Boston also has sibling priorities, but in general, some seats at every school will likely be open to all students .
18When m = 2 it is a weakly dominant strategy for every student to rank truthfully under the Boston mechanism,
and the outcome is trivially the same as under DA.
19Since all students are guaranteed public education, it is reasonable to assume
P
s qs  n. Restricting to equality
is without loss of generality, and the result presented here will hold in that case as well.
9and we discuss what happens with this assumption after the formal proposition. Each student i
privately draws a vector of vNM utility values v = (v1;:::;vm) from a ﬁnite set V  [0;1]m; we will
often refer to this vector as an agent’s “type”. Preferences are strict, and we normalize the best and
worst schools to have utilities 1 and 0 for each type; formally, for any v2 V (i) s 6= t =) vs 6= vt,
(ii) maxs vs = 1 and (iii) mins vs = 0. Let pv be the probability a student draws type v, with
P
v2V pv = 1. This prior is the same for all students, and is common knowledge.
Finally, we need some notation related to the priority structure. Let i
s 2 N be the priority level
of student i at school s. i
s = 1 means that i is in the best possible priority level at s, though each
level can have many (possibly all) students. Let sl = fj 2 N : j
s = lg be the set of students in the
lth priority level at school s, with cardinality jslj. The priority structure is public information, and
ties within a priority level are broken randomly when calculating expected utility.
For any priority structure, let l
s be the critical priority level at s in the sense that any student
with i
s  l
s is guaranteed to be admitted to school s if they rank s ﬁrst under the Boston mechanism,
independent of the strategies of other students; these students also cannot be admitted to a worse
school under DA. Formally, l
s = maxfl 2 N :
Pl
j=1 jsjj  qsg. It is possible that no such l
s exists,
in which case we let l
s = 0.20
To achieve our result, we must make the following assumption on the priority structure: there




t. In words, all this means is
that there is some student who is guaranteed admission to some school, but not to another. We will
focus on such a student who prefers t to s.
A strategy  for each player is  : V ! (), where () denotes the set of probability
distributions over , the set of ordinal rankings of schools. The solution concepts are dominant
strategies for DA and Bayesian Nash equilibria (in undominated strategies) for Boston.21 Here, we
analyze welfare from an interim perspective, after students learn their own types, but before they
learn the types of other students or the outcome of the lottery used to break ties. In the proof of
the proposition, we construct a type space such that Boston does not Pareto dominate DA in any
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exist type spaces V such that some types of students are interim strictly better
oﬀ under deferred acceptance than under any equilibrium outcome of the Boston mechanism.
As mentioned in the introduction, this is similar in spirit to “impossibility results” common in
the matching literature in that we are able to construct preferences for which the interim Pareto
dominance of Boston over DA will not hold. The proof of the proposition is in the appendix, but
20This is the case with no school priorities, as no student is guaranteed admission to any school.
21Such an equilibrium exists by standard arguments.
10the intuition is similar to the examples above. When the condition on the priority structure holds,
we can construct a type space such that i ﬁnds it optimal to rank the school she is guaranteed at
(school s) ﬁrst under Boston, rather than risk trying for a better school (t) and missing, thereby
ending up at a school worse than either. Under DA, she is guaranteed a school no worse than s, but,
has some strictly positive chance of receiving t, and thus is strictly better oﬀ. We use non-common
ordinal preferences to ensure that student i has a strictly positive probability of receiving t under
DA. Restricting to common ordinal preferences, we could only say that DA is weakly better than
Boston for this student, because she would receive s under both mechanisms. Alternatively, we could
strenghten the condition on the priority structure slightly to ensure that i has some positive chance
at receiving t under DA.22 In summary, we are trying to highlight the role played by priorities, and
the general idea holds regardless of the assumption on preferences: students with high priority at
schools in the middle of their ordinal rankings for which they have relatively high cardinal utilities
will prefer deferred acceptance because they do not have to give up this priority when applying for
higher ranked schools.
Combining this with ideas of earlier works, we see that it will generally not be possible to argue
for one mechanism over the other based on interim Pareto dominance. Also, note that the condition
on the priority structure is somewhat weak, and is likely to be satisﬁed in a wide range of real life
scenarios. In situations where priorities are based on factors such as walk zones, the condition will
likely be satisﬁed, as students will be guaranteed admission to their neighborhood school, but not to
other schools outside of their neighborhood.
While the proof uses a type space consisting of only three types, similar intuition will hold in larger
markets where we expect many diﬀerent types of students. Additionally, we only show explicitly that
one student is better oﬀ under DA, but in general there can be many students for which this is true.
Intuitively, any student whose highest priority is at a school in the middle of her ordinal rankings
will be worse oﬀ under Boston if they perceive a lot of competition for schools they like more and
decide not to take the risk of applying to them.
22Formally, this would mean that 9i such that i
t = l




j=1 jtjj < qt. Many real world priority
structures do satisfy this criterion, as schools often only have a few very broad priority classes. See, for example,
http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/ﬁles/IntroBPS09%20English.pdf for a description of the priority structure used
by the city of Boston.
115 Boston Ex-Ante Pareto Dominates Any Strategyproof As-
signment Rule
As the previous discussion has shown, the interim Pareto dominance results will in general fail with
the introduction of nontrivial priorities. This necessitates a search for other criteria by which to
compare the two mechanisms, and the criterion we propose is ex-ante Pareto dominance. Consider
Example 2 above, in which each student was distributed a ‘high’ priority at school B independently
with probability qB = 1=3. In Example 2, we showed that conditional on having high priority at
school B, a student may prefer DA. However, if we take the equilibrium found there and calculate
the expected utility of any agent before she knows whether she has high priority or not, it is possible
to show that her expected utility will be (strictly) higher under the Boston mechanism than under
DA. Since all students are symmetric from this point of view, we immediately see that the Boston
mechanism once again (strictly) Pareto dominates DA from this perspective, even with a nontrivial
priority structure.
Rather than showing this calculation explicitly for this example, we will move immediately to
a general model. We can actually show more than the above and show that in situations with
common ordinal preferences (but arbitrary priority structures), Boston will ex-ante (weakly) Pareto
dominate any strategyproof mechanism that is anonymous in the sense that the assignment depends
only on the submitted preferences and priorities, and not on the labels of the agents. This will
include, for example, the DA algorithm with random priority tie-breaking and the top trading cycles
(TTC) algorithm as deﬁned for school choice problems by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) (also
modiﬁed to include random tie-breaking). This ex-ante notion is useful because we are able to allow
for arbitrary priority structures and yet can still Pareto rank various mechanisms. The notion is also
relevant to a school district superintendent who must decide between mechanisms and is interested
in maximizing the overall ex-ante welfare of students in the school district. Alternatively, we can
make a “veil of ignorance” type argument for the use of the Boston mechanism, in that a student who
did not know her place in society (in particular, her priorities) would choose the Boston mechanism
over any strategyproof and anonymous alternative.
To formalize these statements, we must expand our earlier model. As in section 4, we let S and N
be sets of schools and students and q be the school capacity vectors with
Pm
s=1 qs = n.  once again
denotes the set of all possible (strict) ordinal rankings of the schools in S, and, as above, V  [0;1]m
is a ﬁnite set of vNM utility vectors over the schools. We impose the restriction of common ordinal
preferences, so that, without loss of generality, 1 = v1 >  > vm = 0 for all v = (v1;:::;vm) 2 V.
This assumption has been used in the literature as an approximation of situations of high conﬂict
12amongst students, common in many school choice problems, and allows us to highlight the role of
priorities and ex-ante welfare while still keeping the analysis tractable.23 Without this assumption,
the model is much more diﬃcult to analyze, and we brieﬂy discuss these situations in the next section.
Since the priorities of each student are no longer common knowledge, we will incorporate them
as part of a student’s type. Formally, it is known a priori that each school s has Ls priority levels
(let f1;:::;Lsg denote the set of priority levels at s). Nature will randomly assign each student to
exactly one priority level at each school, where the probability any student is assigned to level k
at school s is sk (so
PLs
k=1 sk = 1 for all s). The sk’s are common knowledge, and the priority
draws are independent across both students and schools. For a student i; let i = (i
1;:::;i
m) be a
vector denoting his priority level at each of the m schools, and let P be the set of all such feasible
vectors; formally, P = m
s=1f1;:::;Lsg. For a priority vector i = (i
1;:::;i
m) 2 P, deﬁne gi as the
probability any student is assigned this priority vector.24
Thus, a type of a student is composed of a “utility type” vi and a “priority type” i, with the overall
type being (vi;i) 2 V P. We assume that the utility and priority types are drawn independently,
so that the probability that any student i is of overall type (vi;i) is pvigi.25
We will in general denote i 2  as a (submitted) preference proﬁle for agent i and  =
(1;:::;n) as a collection of proﬁles for all agents. Similarly, Let  = (1;:::n) be the collec-
tion of all students’ priority vectors. For notational simplicity, we will sometimes denote the type
of student i as i = (vi;i) 2 V  P, and the type proﬁle of all students other than i as  i. Let
 = (1;:::n).
In all of the mechanisms we consider, students submit an ordinal preference ranking over schools,
and based on these submitted rankings and priorities, the mechanism assigns the students to schools.
The information structure of the game is such that each student will learn her own preferences
and priorities, but will not know the preferences or priorities of any other student at the time her
23See, for example, Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2010), Miralles (2008), and Featherstone and Niederle (2008),
all of whom impose this assumption for some of their results. Kesten (2010) considers a hybrid model in which schools
are partitioned into “quality classes” such that all students rank schools from diﬀerent partitions the same (and this is
common knowledge), but within a partition, any student’s ordinal preferences are drawn uniformly at random.





i2P gi = 1.
25Note that in this formulation, it is not known a priori how many students will be in each priority level at each
school; that is, the fact that agent i is in the ﬁrst priority level at school s does not change the probability that some
agent j also is in the ﬁrst priority level at s. Rather than letting each student receive priority k at school s with some
ﬁxed probability, we could imagine a formulation in which the size of each priority class at each school is ﬁxed and
known a priori, and nature draws the priority structure uniformly across all those that satisfy these constraints. This
formulation leads to equivalent results to those presented here; what is important is that the students are ex-ante
symmetric. We choose the formulation in the text to avoid extra notational complications.
13preferences are submitted. This is similar to Example 2 in section 3 above, and captures a realistic
situation in which students do not know the exact priorities of every other student, but instead may
only have an estimate of how many students will be in each priority level at each school (i.e., they
know the underlying distribution by which priorities are distributed).26
Because of the lotteries required to break ties, it will be simpler to model the mechanisms we
consider as returning a random assignment for any preference-priority vector input. A random
assignment is an n  m dimensional matrix A such that (i) 0  Ais  1 for all i 2 N and s 2 S,
(ii)
Pm
s=1 Ais = 1 for all i 2 N, and (iii)
Pn
i=1 Ais = qs for all s 2 S. Let A be the set of random
assignment matrices. A random assignment is a matrix where the rows correspond to the (marginal)
distribution with which a student is assigned to each school (and thus must sum to 1) and the
columns similarly correspond to the schools. Since each school can have multiple seats, the columns
sum to the capacity of each school. In the case in which each school has one seat, the columns also all
sum to 1, and the matrix is bistochastic. The Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann theorem then states that every
bistochastic matrix can be written as a (not necesarilly unique) convex combination of permutation
matrices. Since permutation matrices correspond to deterministic assignments, this means that any
random assignment can be feasibly implemented as a lottery over deterministic assignments.
When schools have more than 1 seat, the columns of A may sum to some integer more than
1. Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2009) provide a generalization the Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann
theorem which shows that we are still able to implement any random assignment in our setting as
a lottery over deteministic assignments, and thus we are justiﬁed in considering mechanisms that
provide random assignment matrices as outputs.
Agent i of utility type vi evaluates random assignments by simply calculating expected utility.
Letting Ai denote the ith row of a random assignment matrix, deﬁne the preference relation vi such








An assignment rule here is a function   : (  P)n ! A which, for every submitted preference
proﬁle and priority structure, gives a random assignment. We let (;) = (1;1;:::;n;n) denote
a vector of preference and priority inputs, one for each agent, and, as is standard, will often write
(;) = (i;i; i; i) when we wish to separate the vector into the inputs for agent i and the
remaining agents  i. We let  i(;) be i’s random assignment when the agents submit (;);
that is,  i(;) is the ith row of the random assignment matrix  (;). We will often use the dot
26As in the previous footnote, allowing the students to publicly observe the priorities after they are drawn by Nature
would lead to similar results at the expense of more cumbersome notation. What is important is that the students
are ex-ante symmetric and so from this perspective do not know what priorities they will be assigned.
27Clearly, only the utility type matters for evaluating random assignments, which is why vi does not depend on
i.
14product  i(;)  vi =
P
s2S  is(;)vi
s to calculate the expected utility of agent i of utility type
vi under assignment  (;). Examples of assignment rules include deferred acceptance, the Boston
mechanism, or TTC with some arbitrary priority tie-breaking rule.
Let o : V !  be a function that assigns to any cardinal utility vector v 2 V its associated ordinal
ranking of schools. We will say that an assignment rule is strategyproof if truthfully reporting o(vi)
is a dominant strategy for every agent and every type (vi;i). That is,  i(o(vi);i; i; i) vi
 i(^ i;i; i; i) for all (vi;i) 2 V  P;^ i 2 ;( i; i) 2 (  P)n 1.
We will call a mechanism anonymous if the assignments to the agents depend only on their
submitted preferences and priority vectors, and not on their labels. Formally, let  : N ! N be
any permutation of the agents. Then,   is anonymous if  (i)( 1(1); 1(1);:::; 1(n); 1(n)) =
 i(1;1;:::;n;n) for all submitted preferences and priority vectors; that is, permuting the indices
of the agents simply permutes the rows of the assignment matrix. Note that this also implies that
any two agents who submit the same preferences and have the same priority standing at all schools
will receive the same random assignment. From a fairness perspective, this is a desirable feature
of a mechanism. Most real-world school choice mechanisms use only the preferences submitted by
the agent and their priorities, and so anonymity will be satisﬁed by most standard school choice
mechanisms. For example, when deferred acceptance (or Boston) is used in the presence of weak
priorities for the schools, ties in priority are usually broken by assigning each student a unique random
number. This procedure clearly satisﬁes anonymity as deﬁned here.
Every assignment rule   induces a game of incomplete information (as described above) in which
the students submit an ordinal preference list over schools and their priority vector, and, given these
submissions, assignments are given according to  . For notational purposes, we deﬁne the action
space to be P; however, while students can report any ordinal rankings they wish, any student’s
priority vector i is “hard information” in the sense that it cannot be misreported. In this incomplete
information game, the type space for all agents is V P with common prior pvg as described above.
The strategy space of the “expanded” incomplete information game is , the space of mappings
 : V  P !   P, with the restriction that the second component of (vi;i) is equal to i for all
 2  (i.e., students cannot misreport their priorities). Since both V  P and   P are ﬁnite,  is
also ﬁnite.
For a strategyproof assignment rule, we will consider the dominant strategy equilibrium in which
every agent always truthfully reports her ordinal preferences, i.e. every agent plays the strategy SP
deﬁned by SP(~ v; ~ ) = (o(~ v); ~ ) for all (~ v; ~ ) 2 V  P.
As the Boston mechanism is not a strategyproof assignment rule, we must allow mixing over
deterministic mappings in  to guarantee existence of an equilibrium in the preference revelation
15game induced by the Boston mechanism. We will restrict attention to symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria x 2 () where every agent chooses the same strategy x. Since our game is ﬁnite and the
payoﬀs are symmetric (which follows because the Boston mechanism with symmetric tie-breaking is
anonymous), a symmetric equilibrium exists by standard arguments.28
We analyze welfare from the perspective before students learn their own types, which we call
“ex-ante welfare”. The main result is the following (for a formal deﬁnition of the ex-ante expected
utilities, see the appendix).
Proposition 2. Every student is ex-ante weakly better oﬀ under any symmetric equilibrium of the
Boston mechanism with random tie-breaking than under any strategyproof and anonymous assignment
rule, even under arbitrary priority structures.
Since all agents are ex-ante symmetric, under a strategyproof assignment rule, the ex-ante prob-
ability that they are assigned to any school is simply
qs
n . Because they all submit the same ordinal






n .29 The method of the proof is
to assume all other players are playing their equilibrium strategy under Boston, and then for any
player, identify a strategy that gives her at least as high an (ex-ante) expected utility as she would
receive under the strategyproof rule  SP. Since the equilibrium strategy must be at least as good as
this strategy, all players must be weakly better oﬀ under the Boston mechanism. The strategy that
we use has each student, when of priority i; play the “average” equilibrium strategy of agents in the
population with the same priority type, where the average is taken over all utility types in V. Since
everyone is symmetric before the types are known, this strategy achieves the same level of expected
utility as under  SP.
Since both DA and TTC (as deﬁned in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)) with random tie-
breaking are strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3. Every student is ex-ante weakly better oﬀ under any symmetric equilibrium of the
Boston mechanism than under either deferred acceptance or top trading cycles with random tie-
breaking, even under arbitrary priority structures.
While the propositions claim that Boston is weakly better than strategyproof mechanisms for all
students, the generalization of Example 2 discussed above shows that the converse does not hold
28Also note that since our type and action spaces are ﬁnite, this “ex-ante” formulation is equivalent to a situation in
which each agent chooses her action at an interim stage after her type is realized, but before she knows the types of any
other agents. However, we evaluate welfare from the ex-ante perspective, and so this formulation is more convenient.
29This formula is formally derived in the appendix.
16(i.e., in some cases everyone will strictly prefer Boston, so that DA does not weakly Pareto dominate
Boston). Thus, the welfare criterion has content, and can be used to meaningfully rank mechanisms.
The inuition behind these results is that in this environment where agents are ex-ante symmetric,
strategyproof assignment rules essentially allocate agents purely at random, ignoring the agents’
cardinal preferences. While in general strategyproof rules can favor agents with priorities at certain
schools, this is only advantageous to students who know they have these priorities. Taking the
viewpoint before priorities are realized, this advantage of strategyproof assignment rules is lost, and
the Boston mechanism performs better because it allows agents to express a relatively high cardinal
utility for a school by promoting it over its true ordinal rank. It should also be noted that the
result in Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2010) which ﬁnds that the Boston mechanism interim
Pareto dominates deferred acceptance can also be easily extended via a similar argument to the
one presented here to conclude that Boston will interim Pareto dominate not just DA but also any
strategyproof and anonymous assignment rule when there are no school priorities.
5.1 Non-common ordinal preferences
We ﬁnish by brieﬂy discussing the assumption of common ordinal preferences. This restriction was
needed to get the clear theoretical results in the previous section. As noted in ACY, this assumption
may be regarded as a good approximation in some real life school choice problems where preferences
are highly correlated. Without this restriction, the model becomes much more diﬃcult to analyze.30
One possibility to gain tractability while allowing for non-common ordinal preferences is to use
computational models. Symmetry is a large driving force for the Pareto dominance of the Boston
mechanism both here and in earlier works, and it was exactly the lack of symmetry created by the
introduction of priorities that led to the interim Pareto incomparability of section 3. Thus, it may
be reasonable to expect that Boston will still ex-ante Pareto dominate strategyproof mechanisms in
the model of section 5 even with arbitrary ordinal preferences, as all students would still be ex-ante
symmetric. Miralles (2008) analyzes a computational model similar to the model here and ﬁnds
evidence that Boston does indeed outperform deferred acceptance ex-ante in school choice problems
30There are other stylized restrictions that can make such models more tractable. For example, Roth and Rothblum
(1999) and Ehlers (2008) consider models of “symmetric” information where students have very little information
about the ordinal preferences of others, which is at the opposite extreme of our assumption of common ordinal
preferences. Kesten (2010) proposes a hybrid model where schools are partitioned into “quality classes”, but within
each class, preferences are “symmetric” in the Roth and Rothblum sense. Featherstone and Niederle (2008) show
that in symmetric environments where the preferences of other students are drawn uniformly from , truthtelling
is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and Boston outperforms DA at the interim stage both in theory and in
experiments.
17with arbitrary ordinal preferences and priority structures. The theoretical results presented here
and elsewhere, combined with such computational models, give some justiﬁcation for the use of the
Boston mechanism from an ex-ante welfare perspective, even in the most general situations.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the welfare consequences of various school choice mechanisms. Recent work
has renewed interest in the Boston mechanism from a welfare perspective by showing that once we
incorporate the lotteries necessary to break priority ties and cardinal utility values into the model,
Boston may unambiguously outperform deferred acceptance on interim welfare grounds in situations
with common ordinal preferences and no school priorities. However, these interim Pareto dominance
results are not robust to the introduction of nontrivial (weak) priorities, and so we must search
for other criteria to compare the mechanisms when schools may have more complicated priority
structures. We ﬁnd that from an ex-ante perspective, Boston Pareto dominates not just DA, but any
strategyproof and anonymous mechanism, even when schools may have arbitrary priority structures.
Thus, we suggest ex-ante Pareto dominance as a welfare criterion to rank school choice mechansims.
This criterion is relevant to real-world school superintendents and to hypothetical students behind
a “veil of ignorance,” and gives justiﬁcation for the use of the Boston mechanism in school choice
problems.
Previous work and the current paper all highlight the ever present tradeoﬀ between welfare and
incentive properties, especially when weak priorities lead to diﬃculties over the best way to break
ties. We do not deﬁnitively endorse any mechanism here, but simply inform the debate between
them, in particular by introducing the notion of ex-ante Pareto dominance into the school choice
literature. More theoretical, experimental, and empirical work is needed to either decide between
these mechanisms or to ﬁnd new mechanisms that do a better job of balancing these tradeoﬀs. These
are important areas of future research for academics and parents alike.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Fix i;s;t as in the statement of the proposition. We will construct a type space consisting of two
vectors V = fu;v;wg for which student i chooses to apply to school s in equilibrium in round 1 of
the Boston mechanism even when it is not his favorite school. Let ut = vt = ws = 1 (so that t is the
best school for types u and v, and s is the best for types w). Let pu > 0 be the probability that a
student is of type u, and similarly for pv > 0 and pw > 0, with pu + pv + pw = 1.
We will make the argument in several steps. First, deﬁne the set X as follows. If
Pl
t
k=1 jtkj = qt,






k=1 jtkj < qt, then X = f[
l
t
k=1tkg [ Z, where Z is any set such that
Z  t(l
t+1), jZj = qt  
Pl
t
k=1 jtkj, and i = 2 Z.
In words, the set X is a set of exactly qt students other than i who have some positive probability
of receiving school t when they rank it ﬁrst, even if everyone else is also ranking t ﬁrst.31 The set is
well deﬁned because of the deﬁnition of l
t.
Step 1. There exists a type u such that it is a dominant strategy for any j 2 X to rank t ﬁrst when
of type u.
31Note that i = 2 X because i
t > l
t and we have speciﬁed i = 2 Z.
20Proof. Let u be any vector that satisﬁes 1 = ut > 1=n   "u > (maxk6=t uk) >  > (mink6=t uk) = 0
for some "u 2 (0;1=n). Consider some j 2 X and some proﬁle of strategies of the other players  j.
Ranking t ﬁrst gives j a probability pj( j)  1=n of being admitted to t.32 There are two cases.
Case (i): pj( j) = 1
If pj( j) = 1, then j is guaranteed a seat at t if he ranks t ﬁrst. Since t is j’s favorite school
when he is of type u, it is obviously dominant to do so.
Case (ii): 1=n  pj( j) < 1
When j is of type u, ranking t ﬁrst gives an expected utility that is bounded below by pj( j).
pj( j) < 1 implies that school t is oversubscribed in round 1, and hence will be unavailable at
round 2. Thus, ranking some other school ﬁrst means that j cannot receive t, which implies that his
expected utility is bounded above by 1=n   "u. Since pj( j)  1=n > 1=n   "u, any strategy that
does not rank t ﬁrst is dominated by any strategy that does.
Now, consider a modiﬁed priority structure at s where the set of students with priority l is deﬁned
as Ysl = (sl nX)nfig. Deﬁne ^ ls analogously to l
s, that is ^ ls = maxfl :
Pl
k=1 jYskj  qsg. Deﬁne the
set X0 exactly as we deﬁned X above, only replacing all t’s with s’s, jtkj’s with jYskj’s, and l
t’s with
^ ls’s.
In words, the set X0 is a set of qs students who have a nonzero probability of receiving s when
they rank it ﬁrst, given that all students in X and student i are not competing for s in round 1.33
Step 2. Assume that i ranks t ﬁrst when of type v. Then, given step 1, there exists a w such that
the best responses of all students j 2 X0 consist only of strategies that rank s ﬁrst when of type w.









some j 2 X0 and some strategy proﬁle  j of the other players satisfying the stated assumptions.




n of being admitted to s. Apply the same argument
used in step 1.
Step 3. There exists a type v such that 1 = vt > vs > , yet student i of type v ranks s ﬁrst in
any equilibrium.












2 ]. Note that "v <  < 1, and let v be
any vector such that 1 = vt > vs >  > "v > maxk6=s;t vk >  > mink6=s;t vk = 0.
32This is true because we assumed that every j 2 X has a positive probability of being admitted to t even when
everyone else ranks t ﬁrst. Since there are only n students, this probability cannot be less than 1=n.
33Such a set exists because we have assumed that n > qs + qt.
21Assume there existed an equilibrium in which student i of type v ranked t ﬁrst, rather than s.34
By step 2, in this equilibrium, all students j 2 X0 must rank s ﬁrst when of type w. Thus, in this






2 that i is not admitted to either s or t, and in this case,













2 ]vt = . If i ranks s ﬁrst, she is guaranteed admission, giving expected utility
vs > . This means that ranking s ﬁrst is a proﬁtable deviation, which is a contradiction.
To complete the argument, consider any V = fu;v;wg satisfying steps 1-3. By steps 1-3, in
any equilibrium of the Boston mechanism, student i ranks s ﬁrst and receives utility vs, where
vs < vt = 1. Under deferred acceptance, all students rank truthfully, and student i is guaranteed a
school no worse for her than s. However, she has some positive probability of receiving school t,36
meaning her expected utility under DA is pvt + (1   p)vs for some p > 0. Thus, student i is strictly
better oﬀ under DA.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Before proving the proposition, we ﬁrst formally state the deﬁnition of expected utility.
Given a proﬁle of pure strategies of the expanded game s 2 n, let s() 2 (  P)n denote the
proﬁle of actions taken when the realized type is : Letting sj(j) 2   P denote the action taken
by agent j when of type j (and similarly, s j( j) is the proﬁle of actions of all agents other than j
when the realized types are  j), we can write the ex-ante expected utility to any agent i under an
assignment rule   as
P
2(VP)n Pr() i(si(i);s i( i))  vi (recall the notation i = (vi;i)).
Let  SP denote any strategyproof and anonymous assignment rule, and let SP 2  be the
truthful mapping deﬁned in the main text. Then, the ex-ante expected utility to any agent i under













34Ranking any school besides t or s ﬁrst is dominated by ranking s ﬁrst.
35For example, when all j 2 X are of type u and all k 2 X0 are of type w, schools s and t are ﬁlled in round 1, by
steps 1 and 2. This happens with probability pqt
u pqs
w. The extra 1=2 factor is necessary because if i
t = l
t+1, then i has
some positive probability (less than or equal to 1/2) of being admitted to t when he is competing against all other
people in X for it.
36For example, when all students are of type w and therefore rank t last. This is the only place in the argument
where diﬀerent ordinal preferences are necessary.
22Let  BM be the Boston mechanism assignment rule (with random tie-breaking of priorities).
Let z = (z1;:::;zn) 2 ()n be a vector of mixed strategies, and, for i 2 ; write Przi(i) for
the probability that strategy zi assigns to the mapping i, and let Prz() =
Qn
j=1 Przj(j) for the
probability that the vector of (pure) strategies is  = (1;:::;n) under mixed strategy proﬁle z.
















With slight abuse of notation, let z = (z;:::;z) be a symmetric equilibrium of the Boston
mechanism where each agent plays strategy z 2 (). By symmetry, we can drop the dependence
of the expected utility on i, and simply write EUBM(z). With these deﬁnitions, Proposition 2 can
now be formally written as:
Proposition 2. EUBM(z)  EUSP for any symmetric equilibrium of the Boston mechanism
z.
This will be proved via two claims.








Proof. Let   = (o(v);:::;o(v)) 2 n denote a vector of submitted preferences where each agent
submits the same common ordinal preference vector o(v) (since we assume common ordinal prefer-
ences, v can be any element of V). Because  SP is strategyproof, we know the agents will submit
this preference proﬁle in equilibrium. This strategy and the distribution over priority types induce
a distribution over actions (;) 2 (  P)n taken by the agents in equilibrium (recall that agents
must report their priority type truthfully). Let Pr(;) denote the probability that the action proﬁle
is (;). Since we know the submitted preference vector will be   with probability 1, we can drop






















is ( ;) (2)
Focus on the last term
P
2Pn Pr() SP
is ( ;). Letting  : N ! N be any permutation of the
agents, partition the set of priority vectors Pn into R subsets (H1;:::;HR) such that ^  = (^ 1;:::; ^ n)
and ~  = (~ 1;:::; ~ n) belong to the same partition member if and only if there exists a permutation 
such that (^ 1;:::; ^ n) = (~  1(1);:::; ~  1(n)). Note that by our assumption that priority vectors are
independent across agents, if ^  and ~  both belong to the same partition member, then Pr(^ ) = Pr(~ ).













is ( ;) (3)
Consider an arbitrary Hr, and ﬁx any ^  = (^ 1;:::; ^ n) 2 Hr. For any other ~  2 Hr, by anonymity
of  SP, we can write  SP
is ( ; ~ ) =  SP
(i)s( ; ^ ) for the permutation  such that (^ 1;:::; ^ n) =
(~  1(1);:::; ~  1(n)). Since all permutations are represented and are equally likely, we express every
term in the second summation as a function of the ﬁxed ^  by simply changing the index corresponding
















for the ﬁxed ^ . The last equality follows because we are now simply summing the sth column of the
assignment matrix  SP( ; ^ ), which by deﬁnition is qs.37 Now, since
PR
r=1 Pr(Hr) = 1, equation (3)
is just
qs
n . Plugging this into (2), we get that the ex-ante expected utility under any strategyproof








Claim 2. Consider any symmetric equilibrium of the Boston mechanism. Then, assuming all
other agents follow their equilibrium strategies, any agent has a strategy that gives ex-ante expected
utility equal to EUSP.
Let z 2 () be any symmetric equilibrium of the game induced by  BM (i.e., all students play
the same strategy z). It will be convenient to represent this strategy in an equivalent manner as
a function  : V  P ! (); that is, rather than randomizing over deterministic mappings in ,
a strategy is a function from types into randomizations over actions in . From the perspective of
agent i, the equilibrium strategies again induce a probability distribution over action proﬁles of the
other agents ( i; i) 2 (  P)n 1. Denote the probability that the agents  i play action proﬁle
( i; i) as Pr( i; i), and note that since types are independent, this distribution is independent
of the type of agent i. Given this distribution, we can deﬁne a quantity Ps;i(y) to be the probability
that a student is admitted to school s when playing strategy y 2 (), conditional on having
priority vector i, and assuming all other agents follow their equilibrium strategies.38 In equilibrium,
the following must hold:
37To put it more simply, conditional on Hr, the matrix  SP( ; ~ ) is the same as  SP( ; ^ ) only with the rows
permuted in the same manner as the priority vectors. All priority vectors are equally likely, so ex-ante, all agents are
equally likely to be “assigned” any row of the (ﬁxed) matrix  SP( ; ^ ).



























The double summation is just the ex-ante probability that any given student is assigned to school
s in equilibrium, which, by symmetry, is the same across students. Multiplying this by n gives the
total number of seats assigned at school s, which, in equilibrium, must be equal to qs.
Consider some agent i who, rather than playing the prescribed equilibrium strategy , deviates
to the strategy ^  : V P ! () deﬁned as follows: ^ (v;0) :=
P
~ v2V (~ v;0)p~ v. That is, she plays
the “average” strategy of agents in the population with priority vector 0 2 P, averaging over ~ v. The
















































where the equality is just a rearrangement of the summations. But now, the double sum can be










which means that strategy ^  gives the same ex-ante expected utility as EUSP.
Since the ^  constructed in Claim 2 is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy, the equilibrium
strategy  must give a weakly higher expected utility than that under  SP, which completes the
proof.
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